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Abstract
We study the contagion game with the bilingual option on infinite regular graphs introduced and modeled
mathematically in [N. Immorlica et al. (2007)]. In the reference, Immorlica et al. studied conditions for an
innovation to become epidemic over infinite regular trees, the grid, and the infinite thick-lines in terms of
payoff enhancement and cost of the bilingual option. We improved their results by showing that the class
of infinite regular trees make an innovation least advantageous to become epidemic considering the whole
class of infinite regular graphs. Moreover, we show that any infinite ∆-regular graph containing the infinite
∆-tree structure is also least advantageous to be epidemic. Also, we construct an infinite family of infinite
∆-regular graphs (including the thick ∆-line) that is the most advantageous to be epidemic as known so far.
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1. Introduction
“Diffusion of innovations” studies the diffusion processes of new ideas, technologies, products, or services
through a society over time [1]. It has attracted a lot of interest in various fields such as anthropology,
sociology, political science, and economics [2, 3]. It is not trivial to predict that an innovation will diffuse
to a society, because people decide to adopt the innovation after careful consideration of the benefit from
the adoption. Many studies have reported that people adopt the innovation when the exposure (the ratio
of adopters of the innovation in the neighborhood) is larger than a certain level of value - called a threshold
[1, 4, 5, 6].
A threshold is an exposure value assigned for each agent to take innovation if it did not take innovation
yet. In the simplest case where every agent has the same number of neighbors (∆) and a constant threshold
(t) smaller than 1/∆, the final state is trivial: the whole population will adopt the innovation eventually. In
other words, the innovation is spread over the population. If an innovation is spread over the population, then
we say that it becomes epidemic. On the other hand, if a given threshold is high enough, then the innovation
stops diffusing at some time. Morris[7] showed that with a threshold bigger than 1/2 an innovation is never
spread over any graph structure and both strategies will coexist eventually.
Inspired by Morris, Immorlica et al.[8] developed a model introducing a bilingual option at a cost r,
which is compatible with both strategies. In this bilingual model a possible threshold for an innovation to
be epidemic over an infinite regular graph depends on r, say tr. They studied this problem and determined
the maximum value for tr completely for every r > 0 on infinite regular trees, the grid, and the infinite
thick-lines. We call this maximum value the contagion threshold. (See also [9, 10]. For similar problems
under different conditions, see [11, 12].)
In this paper, we revisit this problem and obtain more results by finding a structure attaining the
(universal) minimum of contagion thresholds among the whole class of infinite regular graphs. In section
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2, we present basic preliminaries for the problem and our main results. In the section, we show that the
contagion threshold of any infinite ∆-regular graph containing the infinite ∆-regular tree structure becomes
the universal lower bound for contagion thresholds of all infinite ∆-regular graphs. Also, we construct an
infinite family of infinite ∆-regular graphs (including the thick ∆-line) that are the most advantageous to
be epidemic as known so far. In section 3, we discuss further directions.
2. Main Results
2.1. Preliminaries
We consider connected infinite regular graphs unless mentioned otherwise and follow the model and
setting introduced in [8]. We denote by V (G) the vertex set of G.
Our main question is: what kind of graph structure on a population is more advantageous for a new
strategy to be spread over the old strategy in the population?
An A-B coordination game on an infinite regular graph G is a pair (G, q), where every vertex gets the
payoffs from the payoff matrix in Table 1 while it plays a game with its neighbors.
A B
A 1− q, 1− q 0, 0
B 0, 0 q, q
Table 1: The payoffs in an A-B coordination game (G, q)
An initial strategy profile is a function f0 : V (G) −→ {A,B}. We call S0 = f
−1
0 (A) an initial set of a
game. Let α = {vi}∞i=1 be a sequence of V (G), where every vertex in V (G) appears at least once in α. An
assignment fα : α −→ {A,B} in (G, q) is called a profile along α if fα is determined as follows: (1) start
with an initial strategy profile f0 and let fα = f0 and (2) for each i in order, update fα(vi) as the strategy
that gives the higher payoff to vi based on the payoff matrix in Table 1 after playing with its neighbors using
the current assignment.
In an A-B coordination game (G, q), strategy A becomes epidemic if there is a sequence α of V (G) and
a finite initial set S0 such that the rule for fα forces that for every v ∈ V (G) there is an index i such that
fα(vi) = A. We call Q the contagion threshold of G if (1) A becomes epidemic in (G, q) for every q < Q and
(2) A never becomes epidemic in (G, q) for any q > Q.
It is easy to see that Q ≥ 1/∆ for every infinite regular graph. Morris [7] proved that the contagion
threshold Q is always at most 1/2 and the sharpness is achieved by thick lines. For even ∆, the thick line
L∆ is a graph with a vertex set Z× {1, 2, · · · ,∆/2} and an edge set {((k, i), (l, j)) : |k − l| = 1}.
Our main concern in this paper is the case that there are two incompatible strategies A and B, and
another option AB that is compatible with A and B. (We call AB a bilingual option.) Immorlica et al. set
this bilingual model using a two-player game called a contagion game [8]. To prevent a game from being
trivial such that the bilingual option AB becomes epidemic in every graph, there needs a cost to pay for
choosing AB.
To begin with, all the vertices have (old) strategy B. Now a new strategy A is introduced to finitely
many vertices in V (G), and the game starts along a given sequence. If a vertex takes a particular strategy,
then the payoff that the player earns is the total of the payoff the player earns from its neighbors. While
playing the game, each vertex at its turn chooses a strategy giving the largest payoff among A, B, or AB.
Given a sequence of vertices in V (G) and for 0 < q < 1 and r > 0, a contagion game (G, q, r) is a
coordination game where every vertex plays a game with its neighbors using the payoff matrix presented in
Table 2. In this paper, as mentioned above we consider a contagion game, where there are three strategies
for each vertex to choose: A,B, or AB. If a vertex chooses one strategy, then the total payoff from this
choice is the sum of the payoffs from playing with the neighbors of the vertex. For example, if a vertex
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A B AB
A 1− q, 1− q 0, 0 1− q, 1− q − r
B 0, 0 q, q q, q − r
AB 1− q − r, 1− q q − r, q max(q, 1− q)− r,max(q, 1− q)− r
Table 2: The payoffs in a contagion game (G, q, r)
chooses A, then the payoff it gets by playing with a neighbor having strategy A, B, and AB (resp.) is 1− q,
0, and max(q, 1− q)− r (resp.).
Note that the remaining part after deleting the row and column of AB in Table 2 is the same as the
payoff matrix in Table 1. We mimic the definition for the strategy A to be epidemic.
An initial strategy profile is a function f0 : V (G) −→ {A,B}. We call S0 = f
−1
0 (A) an initial set of a
game. Let α = {vi}∞i=1 be a sequence of V (G), where every vertex in V (G) appears at least once in α. An
assignment fα : α −→ {A,B,AB} in a contagion game (G, q, r) is called a profile along α if fα is determined
as follows: (1) start with an initial strategy profile f0 and let fα = f0 and (2) for each i in order, update
fα(vi) as the strategy that gives higher payoff to vi based on the payoff matrix in Table 2 after playing with
its neighbors using the current assignment.
In a contagion game (G, q, r), strategy A becomes epidemic if there is a sequence α of V (G) and a finite
initial set S0 such that the rule for fα forces that for every v ∈ V (G) there is an index i such that fα(vi) = A.
In other words, the strategy A becomes epidemic in (G, q, r) if there are a finite set S and a sequence
of vertices in V (G) − S, say v1, v2, v3, · · · , satisfying that for every v in V (G) − S there is an index k such
that (1) v = vk and (2) at the k-th turn along the sequence the best strategy for v is A when having started
with As for the vertices of S while other vertices had initially B.
Note that the definition of epidemic status depends on q and r as well as G because it is possible that
A is not epidemic for different q and r even with the same graph (G), the same finite set (S), and the same
sequence (α).
For a fixed r > 0, we call Qr the contagion threshold of G if (1) A becomes epidemic in (G, q, r) for every
q < Qr and (2) A never becomes epidemic in (G, q, r) for any q > Qr. For an infinite regular graph G, the
epidemic region denoted ΩG is {(q, r) : A becomes epidemic in (G, q, r)}. Therefore, the boundary curve of
an epidemic region is the points consisting of (Qr, r) for every r > 0.
Let Ω∆ =
⋃
G ΩG, where the union is taken over all infinite ∆-regular graphs. In this paper we focus on
determining Ω∆ for every ∆ ≥ 2.
It is known that no vertex can change either from A to B, from A to AB, or from AB to B when
taking its best response in a contagion game (G, q, r) [8]. Hence there are only two possible types for (q, r)
to be in the epidemic region: (1) A is always the best response for every turn of vertices and (2) AB is
the best response for some vertex but finitely many turns later the best strategy for the vertex is eventually A.
It is useful to apply the concept of blocking structure and results on blocking structures introduced in [8].
We say (X,Y ) a non-trivial pair of disjoint sets if either X 6= ∅ or Y 6= ∅. For a contagion game (G, q, r),
a non-trivial pair (SAB, SB) of disjoint subsets of V (G) is called a blocking structure for (G, q, r) if the pair
satisfies the following properties:
1. for every v ∈ SAB, degSB (v) >
r
q
∆,
2. for every v ∈ SB
(a) (1− q) degSB (v) + min(q, 1− q) degSAB (v) > (1− q − r)∆ and
(b) degSB (v) + q degSAB (v) > (1− q)∆,
where degSAB (v) and degSB (v) are the number of neighbors of v in SAB and SB, respectively.
Theorem 1. [8] For every contagion game (G, q, r), strategy A cannot be epidemic in (G, q, r) if and only
if every co-finite set of vertices of G contains a blocking structure.
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Also, in the same reference, the authors showed that (q, r) with q > 1/2 cannot be in the epidemic region
for any infinite regular graph. Therefore, max(q, 1 − q) = 1− q in Table 1 for payoffs to be epidemic.
2.2. Our Results
We find a sufficient condition for each vertex (i.e. agent) to adopt A as its best strategy in the given
game (G, q, r). The condition will be formulated in terms of r and q.
Lemma 2. Let G be an infinite ∆-regular graph. Suppose that there is an order of finite subsets of vertices
V0, V1, · · · such that
1.
The union of Vi’s is V (G), that is,
∞⋃
i=0
Vi = V (G) and
2. Given ǫ with 0 < ǫ < 1, for each i and v ∈ Vi,
dV0∪V1∪···∪Vi−1(v) ≥ ǫ∆.
Then (q, r) satisfying r > (1− ǫ)q and q < ǫ is in the epidemic region for G.
Proof. We prove that for each i every v ∈ Vi has A as the best strategy under the given condition. We use
induction on i. Starting from an initial situation that every vertex uses strategy B, we locate strategy A at
every vertex in V0. This automatically satisfies the basis. Now assume that the vertices in V0 ∪ V1 · · · ∪Vi−1
adopted A as their strategies. For each vertex u ∈ Vi the payoff of strategy A is p1 which is at least (1−q)ǫ∆.
The payoff of strategy B is p2 which is at most (1− ǫ)∆q. The payoff of strategy AB is p1+ p2− r∆. Hence
the vertex u has A as the best strategy on (G, q, r) game whenever q and r satisfy r∆ > p2 and p1 > p2.
In particular, if r > (1 − ǫ)q and q < ǫ, then p1 − p2 ≥ (1 − q)ǫ∆ − (1 − ǫ)∆q = ∆(ǫ − q) > 0. Also,
p1 − (p1 + p2 − r∆) = r∆ − p2 > (1 − ǫ)q∆− p2 > (1− ǫ)q∆− (1− ǫ)∆q = 0.
After locating strategy A at each vertex in V0 we let vertices in sets V1, V2, · · · play their best strategy.
Eventually A becomes epidemic along the order. 
An infinite regular-tree is a connected, acyclic, and infinite graph each of whose degree is the same. As
an easy consequence, if we pick a vertex in the infinite ∆-regular tree, then by considering Vi be the set of
the vertices at depth i and by letting ǫ ≤ 1∆ the set {(q, r) : r ≥
∆−1
∆ q, q ≤
1
∆} is contained in ΩT∆ . In fact,
it is not hard to see that ΩT∆ = {(q, r) : r ≥
∆−1
∆ q, q ≤
1
∆} ∪ {(q, r) : 2q +∆r ≤ 1}.
Theorem 3. Let ΩT∆ be the epidemic region for the infinite ∆-regular tree T∆. For every infinite ∆-regular
graph G, ΩT∆ ⊆ ΩG. In other words, ΩT∆ is the minimum epidemic region that any infinite ∆-regular graph
possibly has.
Proof. By Theorem 1 for any (q, r) in the complement of the epidemic region ΩG, every co-finite set of
V (G) contains a blocking structure (SB , SAB) for (G, q, r). Therefore, {(q, r) : q, r > 0}−ΩG is the union of
Ω1 and Ω2, where Ω1 consists of (q, r) allowing a blocking structure with SAB 6= ∅ and Ω2 consists of (q, r)
allowing a blocking structure with SAB = ∅.
Let (q, r) be in{(q, r) : q, r > 0} − ΩG = Ω1 ∪ Ω2, and we consider a blocking structure (SB , SAB) in a
co-finite set of V (G).
Case 1) SAB 6= ∅:
We let av = degSB (v) and bv = degSAB (v) for any v ∈ SB. Hence, av, bv ≥ 0 and av + bv ≤ ∆. Now r and q
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must satisfy that av+qbv > (1−q)∆ and (1−q)av+qbv > (1−q−r)∆. If we let d = minu∈SAB degSB (u), then
d > r
q
∆ by the first condition in the definition of a blocking structure. In other words, r < d∆q. Since av+bv ≤
∆, we let ∆ = av + bv + tv with tv ≥ 0. From those inequalities we obtain that
(
2− t∆−av
)
q + ∆∆−av r > 1
and q > ∆−av2∆−av−tv . Note that there is v0 ∈ SB with a = degSB (v0) < ∆. Therefore
∆−av
∆ ≥
1
∆ . The line(
2− t∆−a
)
q + ∆∆−ar = 1 has the q-intercept that is as large as
1
2 and the r-intercept that is as large as
1
∆ . Also,
∆−av
2∆−av−tv
− 1∆+1 =
∆2−av∆−∆+tv
(2∆−av−tv)(∆+1)
= ∆(∆−av)−(∆−tv)(2∆−av−tv)(∆+1) ≥
∆−(∆−tv)
(2∆−av−tv)(∆+1)
≥ 0. Moreover, d ≥ 1.
Hence, if we let W1 = {(q, r) : 2q +∆r > 1, q >
1
∆+1 , r <
∆−1
∆ q}, then Ω1 ⊆W1.
Case 2) SAB = ∅:
We let av = degSB (v) for any v ∈ SB. Then av ≤ ∆− 1. Now r and q must satisfy that (1) av > (1− q)∆
and (2) (1− q)av > (1 − q − r)∆. If we let W2 = {(q, r) : q >
1
∆ , q +∆r > 1}, then Ω2 ⊆W2.
Now we can see that {(q, r) : q, r > 0} − (W1 ∪W2) is the epidemic region for T∆, and it is contained in
ΩG. 
The next result is that if an infinite regular graph contains an infinite regular tree, then the epidemic
region for the graph is just the same as the epidemic region for an infinite regular tree. We consider a rooted
tree RT∆ defined as follows: the root x0 has ∆− 1 children x11, x
2
1, · · · , x
∆
1 , and each child has ∆ neighbors,
and so on. In other words, T is an infinite rooted tree, where the root has degree ∆− 1 and all the rest of
the vertices have degree ∆.
Theorem 4. If an infinite ∆-regular graph G contains RT∆ as a subgraph, then the epidemic region for G
is the same as the epidemic region for the tree ΩT∆ .
Proof. Let H be a subgraph that is isomorphic to RT∆ in G. Let x0 be the root of H . For any vertex x of
H , the (induced) subtree starting at v is in fact isomorphic to H . Therefore, for any finite subset of V (G),
say C, the remaining graph G − C contains a vertex v of H , and it contains a subtree isomorphic to H
with v as the root. Also, note that an infinite component of T∆ −C′ for any finite set C′ ∈ V (T∆) contains
a subtree isomorphic to RT∆ with a root v
′ for some v′. Therefore, we choose each blocking structure for
(q, r) in H − C exactly the same way as in T∆ − C′ for (q, r).
Now the epidemic region ΩcG contains Ω
c
T∆
, and therefore ΩG ⊆ ΩT∆ . But by Theorem 3, ΩT∆ ⊆ ΩG.
Therefore, ΩG = ΩT∆ . 
Lemma 5. Let G be an infinite ∆-regular graph with even ∆. If for every finite subset C of V (G),
1. there are two disjoint non-empty subsets SB and SAB of V (G)− C such that
(a) degSB (v) ≥
∆
2 for every v ∈ SAB
(b) degSB (u) + degSAB (u) = ∆ for every u ∈ SB
and
2. G− C has a ∆2 -regular subgraph,
then the epidemic region ΩG is a subset of {(q, r) : q, r > 0} − (Ωi ∪Ω′) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ ∆− 1, where
Ωi =
{
(q, r) : r <
1
2
q, 2q +
∆
∆− i
r > 1, q >
∆− i
2∆− i
}
Ω′ =
{
(q, r) : q + 2r > 1, q >
1
2
}
.
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Proof. We show that for any finite subset C of V (G) and for any (q, r) in Ω1 ∪ Ω2, there is a blocking
structure.
We have two cases.
Case 1) Let (q, r) be in Ωi, where i = minv∈SB degSB (v). We use SB and SAB guaranteed in condition
1 of the statement of Lemma 5. Now for any u ∈ SAB, degSB (u) ≥
∆
2 >
r
q
∆ since r < 12q. Now for any
v ∈ SB, let a = degSB (v) and b = degSAB (v), where a + b = ∆. Since SB is non-empty, a ≥ 1. Now we
obtain the following for 1 ≤ a ≤ ∆− 1: (1) (1− q)a+ qb− (1− q − r)∆ = (∆− a)[2q + ∆∆−ar − 1] > 0 and
(2) a+ qb− (1− q)∆ = q(∆ + b)− (∆ − a) > 0. Note that if a′ > a, then q and r satisfy (1) and (2) after
we replace a by a′. We let i = minv∈SB degSB (v). Since SB ∈ G− C, 1 ≤ i < ∆.
Case 2) Let (q, r) be in Ω′. We let SAB = ∅ and SB = V (H), whereH is a
∆
2 -regular subgraph guaranteed
in condition 2 of the statement of Lemma 5. Since SAB is empty the first condition in the definition of a
blocking structure is automatically satisfied. Now using the same notation as Case 1 we have a = ∆2 and
b = 0 for every vertex v ∈ SB . We check the second condition in the definition of a blocking structure:
(1− q)∆2 − (1− q− r)∆ =
∆
2 (q+ 2r− 1) > 0. The third condition for being a blocking structure is satisfied
because a− (1− q)∆ = ∆(q − 12 ) > 0.
By Theorem 1 every (q, r) in Ωi ∪Ω′ is non-epidemic in (G, q, r). 
Corollary 1. If for every finite set C there are two disjoint sets SB and SAB as in Lemma 5 such that
degSB (v) = degSAB (v) =
∆
2 for every v ∈ SB, then the epidemic region of G is contained in ΩL∆.
Proof. The given condition implies that i = ∆2 in the proof of Lemma 5. Then,
Ω∆
2
∪ Ω′ =
{
(q, r) : r <
1
2
q, 2q +
∆
∆− ∆2
r > 1, q >
∆− ∆2
2∆− ∆2
}
∪
{
(q, r) : q + 2r > 1, q >
1
2
}
=
{
(q, r) : r <
1
2
q, 2q + 2r > 1, q >
1
3
}
∪
{
(q, r) : 1 + 2r > 1, q >
1
2
}
.
Therefore, the epidemic region of G is
{(q, r) : q, r > 0} −
(
Ω∆
2
∪ Ω′
)
=
{
(q, r) : q ≤
1
2
, r ≥
1
2
q
}
∪
{
(q, r) : r ≤
1
2
q, 2q + 2r ≤ 1
}
.
Note that the resulting set is the same as ΩL∆ [8]. 
We denote HL∆ a thick half line graph for even ∆. In other words, the vertex set of HL∆ can be
described as N × {1, 2, · · · ,∆/2}. There is an edge between (k, i) and (l, j) if and only if |k − l| = 1. In
HL∆ every vertex (k, i), k ≥ 2 has degree ∆, and every vertex (1, i) has degree ∆/2.
We will construct a family of infinite ∆-regular graphs. The family contains the thick line graph as a
special case. For N ≥ 2 and an even ∆ we consider N copies of HL∆: HL(1), HL(2), · · · , HL(N). Let
V (i) be the vertices of (1, 1), (1, 2), · · · , (1,∆/2) of each copy HL(i). We identify tij vertices in V (i) with
tji vertices in V (j) for i 6= j for some ti ≥ 0 and for some tij ≤
∆
2 , where tij = tji. We add finitely many
vertices to the above graph and add appropriately many edges such that every vertex has degree ∆. Note
that for N = 2 if v12 = v21 = 0 and we add a perfect matching between V (1) and V (2), then the resulting
graph is isomorphic to L∆.
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Theorem 6. The epidemic region for any graph from the construction is the same as ΩL∆.
Proof. We denote G an infinite ∆-regular graph from the construction and ΩG the epidemic region for
G. We let C be a set of vertices of G consisting of V (i), i = 1, 2, · · · , N and the added vertices from the
construction. Hence, C is finite. Starting from the initial state where every vertex takes the strategy B,
the vertices in C take new strategy A. Now we consider (G, q, r) game with every vertex taking its best
strategy.
We name group gim each group of vertices (i, 1), (i, 2), · · · , (i,∆/2) in HL(m). We determine an order of
moves of the vertices with strategy B as follows: g11, g
2
1 , · · · , g
N
1 , g
1
2 , · · · , g
N
2 , g
1
3, · · · . Note that in each group
any order of the ∆/2 vertices works. Then at each stage the payoffs of strategies A,B,AB are ∆2 (1− q),
q∆
2 ,
and ∆2 − r∆, respectively. (Note that it has the same pattern as in the thick line graphs.) Hence, for (q, r)
with q ≤ 12 and r ≥
1
2q the best strategy of a vertex at its turn is A.
On the other hand, for (q, r) with r ≤ 12q and 2q + 2r ≤ 1 the best strategy of a vertex at its turn
(in the same order as above) is AB. As it is described in [8], the payoff of strategies A, B, and AB are
1−q
2 ∆, q∆, and
(
q+1−q
2 ∆
)
− r∆, respectively. Hence, if AB has the best payoff, then ∆2 − r∆ ≥
1−q
2 ∆ and
∆
2 − r∆ ≥ q∆. The inequalities are simplified to r ≤ q/2 and 2q + 2r ≤ 1. We conclude that ΩG contains
{(q, r) : r ≤ 12q, 2q + 2r ≤ 1} ∪ {(q, r) : q ≤
1
2 , r ≥
1
2q}.
To determine the complement of ΩG we consider blocking structures. For any deletion of a finite set of
vertices C the remaining graph still contains a thick half line. Then we find the same blocking structures
used for determining the complement of ΩL∆ .
In L∆, two blocking structures are used: A
∆
2 -regular subgraph K∆2 ,
∆
2
satisfies condition 2 in the
statement of Lemma 5. Also, G − C contains a thick half line as an induced subgraph by a set of vertices
S = {(k, i) : k ≥ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ ∆2 } for some m ≥ 1 from a copy of HL∆. We partition S into SB and SAB.
SB = {(k, i) : k = m,m+ 2,m+ 4,m+ 6, · · · } and SAB = {(k, i) : k = m + 1,m+ 3,m+ 5, · · · }. Now SB
and SAB satisfy condition 1 in the statement of Lemma 5. Moreover, since degSB (v) = degSAB (v) =
∆
2 for
every v ∈ SB, by Corollary 1 ΩG is contained in ΩL∆ . 
Corollary 2. For every even ∆ > 2, there are infinitely many infinite ∆-regular graphs whose epidemic
region is the same as ΩL∆.
Proof. We let k ≥ 2. We construct G∆,k for even ∆ as follows.
Let S be a set of ∆/2 elements. We label the elements of S as x1, x2, · · · , x∆
2
. We consider 2k copies of S.
Let Sm be the m-th copy of S. Let x
m
1 and x
m
∆
2
be the first and the last elements respectively in Sm. We
identify xm1 and x
m−1
∆
2
. In other words, Sm−1 ∩ Sm = {xm1 }. We make the infinite half-line HL(m) with
degree ∆ starting at Sm, where the elements of Sm have degree
∆
2 . Now we consider the 2k
(
∆
2 − 2
)
vertices
in
⋃2k
m=1 Sm −
⋃2k
m=1
{
xm1 , x
m
∆
2
}
.
It is well-known that there is a connected ∆2 -regular graph G
′ on 2k
(
∆
2 − 2
)
vertices. We consider the
following graph G∆,k obtained by adding the edges of G
′ to the union of Sms for m = 1, 2, , ..., 2k. In other
words, G∆,k =
⋃2k
m=1 Sm ∪E(G
′). Now the epidemic region of G∆,k is the same as ΩL∆ . 
3. Discussion
The simplest non-trivial infinite regular graph is when ∆ is 2. There is only one possible such graph:
infinite line L2, which attains the smallest and the largest possible epidemic region simultaneously. For even
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HL(1)
HL(3)
HL(2)
HL(4)
S
S
S
S
1
4
2
3
Figure 1: G8,2 (in Corollary 2)
∆ > 2 there are many non-isomorphic infinite ∆-regular graphs including T∆ and L∆. We showed that the
regular tree has the smallest epidemic region, and we showed that any infinite regular graph containing the
infinite regular tree must have the minimum epidemic region.
Our prediction is that for any infinite ∆-regular graph G, ΩT∆ ⊆ ΩG ⊆ ΩL∆ . In fact for bigger epidemic
regions, the maximum possible epidemic region known so far is ΩL∆ . However, we still do not know whether
ΩL∆ has the maximum epidemic region among all infinite ∆-regular graphs. We conjecture that ΩL∆ is the
maximum region among all infinite ∆-regular graphs.
Along the lines of the results, here are various directions for further research. One way is that we can
apply the setting in a contagion game for non-regular graphs, where the (total) payoffs for a vertex v are
(α+ β)(1 − q), (deg(v) − α)q, and (α + β)(1 − 2q) + q deg(v) − c for strategies A,B, and AB, respectively.
Here each of α, deg(v) − α − β, and β is the number of neighbors with A,B, and AB, respectively. It
is reasonable to assume that the cost c is constant so that a vertex with a high degree tends to adopt a
bilingual strategy because rv = c/deg(v). For non-regular graphs, an epidemic region can be defined in a
similar way. But in this case it is in the (q, c)-plane instead of the (q, r)-plane.
Another possible model reflecting reality more is that we consider a finite graph with N vertices, where N
is the population of a network. It is not clear whether an epidemic behavior on infinite graphs has the same
characterization as the limit of the behavior on finite graphs with N vertices as N → ∞. A corresponding
definition is that we say A is epidemic on a graph with N vertices if there is a finite set of S with size f(N)
and a finite sequence of vertices in V (G)−S for playing the game, v1, v2, v3, · · · , vM , satisfying the following
conditions:
1. limN→∞
f(N)
N
= 0, and
2. for every v in V (G) − S there is k such that (1) v = vk and (2) at the k-th turn in the sequence its
best strategy for the vertex is A when having started with A for the vertices of S while other vertices
have B.
Is there an infinite family of graphs {Gn : |V (Gn)| = n, n = 1, 2, 3, · · · } such that for each corresponding
finite set Sn making Gn epidemic f(n) is constant? In other words, f(n) = o(1)? Also, we can ask how
8
large f(N) could be for an N -vertex graph to be epidemic. How is f(N) related to structure of graphs?
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